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DEREGULATION IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 
by Steven R. Shoemate 
I. Introduction 
Government has always controlled industry 
to some extent even in colonial times; but since 
the passage of the Act to Regulate Commerce 
in 1887, regulation of the private sector has in-
creased dramatically (MacAvoy, p. 15). This 
first Act only regulated railroads, but it estab-
lished a precedent which later led to regulation 
of trucking, airlines, telecommunications, util-
ities, pipelines, banking and a host of other in-
dustries. Mainly by controlling price and entry, 
the regulators hoped to control the unfair price 
and service discrimination caused by the mo-
nopolies which existed when these industries 
were young. This might have been a useful 
short-run solution to these problems in years 
past, but with the changes in technology and 
the nature of competition today, regulation of-
ten hurts, rather than helps, the consumer and 
the economy as a whole. In growing recogni-
tion of this fact, the last two federal government 
administrations have taken major steps to in-
crease competition and decrease regulation. 
President Carter signed into law both the Air-
line Deregulation ACt of 1978 and the Deposi-
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tory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 (Standard and 
Poor 's, 1979, p. A63). President Reagan has 
presided over changes in the telecommunica-
tions industry, including the breakup of AT&T 
(Standard and Poor's, 1982, p. A63). 
In this paper I will demonstrate the bene-
fits of deregulation in today's competitive en-
vironment. I will accomplish this by first pre-
senting some background and history on de: 
regulation in the U.S. Secondly, I will discuss 
the theoretical economic advantages of 
competition and deregulation. Finally, I will 
test these theories through a comparison of the 
performance of a specific industry before and 
after deregulation. The example which I have 
chosen is trucking. and therefore the paper's 
emphasis is on the transportation industry. 
However. it is important to note that the 
economic principles at work apply equally well 
to other industries. 
II. Background 
The movement and impetus for regulation 
of railroads after the Civil War foreshadowed 
that of later regulatory battles. Railroads at the 
time were virtually the only economically feas-
ible way to transport goods, and so like many 
new industries with natural barriers to entry 
and few substitutes, the railroad industry pos-
sessed monopoly powers. During the late 1860s 
and early 1870s, farmers and shippers began to 
complain that collusion among railroads had 
led to extortionate rates, rate discrimination 
against individuals and localities, and the elim-
ination of competition in the transportation in-
dustry. The Granger movement sought to pro-
tect farmers from these abuses by lobbying for 
the passage of regulation at the state level. This 
movement was supported by shippers and even 
by city merchants who were at the mercy of a 
young industry, the demand for whose services 
was price-inelastic. Largely as a result of the ef-
forts of these groups, federal regulation of the 
railroads began in 1887 with the passage of the 
Act to Regulate Commerce, better known as 
the Interstate Commerce Act (Boyer, 1981, 
p. 14). 
Later regulation followed a pattern similar 
to that described above. As the trucking in-
dustry began to compete with railroads and 
threatened to exercise monopolistic powers it-
self, it, too, fell subject to regulation. The re-
sulting Motor Carrier Act of 1935 had as its 
major purposes to "promote adequate econom-
ical efficient service by motor carriers," and to 
"develop and preserve a highway transporta-
tion system adapted to the needs of the com-
merce of the United States" (MacAvoy, 1979, p. 
18). In the case of communications, the Com-
munications Act of 1934 professed "to make 
available so far as possible ... a rapid, efficient, 
nationwide, and worldwide wire and cable serv-
ice with adequate facilities at reasonable 
charges," (MacAvoy, 1979, p. 18). The Civil 
Aeronautics Act of 1938 followed suit by striv-
ing to prevent unduly high air fares as well as to 
eliminate rate wars between competing carri-
ers, rate wars "which would be disastrous to all 
concerned" (MacAvoy, 1979, p. 19). 
The above constitute just a few examples of 
how today's massive web of regulation was 
justified at its inception . In most cases, the 
various acts were accompanied by the creation 
of commissions (such as the Interstate Com-
merce Commission) to study, enact and enforce 
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regulations governing the industries concerned 
(MacAvoy, 1979, p. 20). These commissions 
may well have served a justifiable purpose in 
years past; but since the early 1960s, in the 
minds of many the benefits of regulation now 
appear to be outweighed by the costs. In at-
tempts to keep up with the times, some com-
missions and regulators have enacted new and 
different statutes which in many cases have on-
ly further confounded the situation. President 
Kennedy recognized these problems when he 
took office in 1961 and stated that "a chaotic 
patchwork of inconsistent and often obsolete 
legislation and regulation has evolved from a 
history of specific actions addressed to specific 
problems of specific industries at specific times. 
This patchwork does not fully reflect either the 
dramatic changes in technology ... or the par-
allel changes in the structure of competition" 
(Boyer, 1981, p. 27). 
Because the U.S. economy is now so dras-
tically different than it was at the time when 
regulatory laws were first enacted, their 
primary effect has changed from the control of 
monopoly to the regulation and limitation of la-
tent competitive forces. The transportation in-
dustry provides a prime example of this shift in 
the effects of regulation. Since at least 1960, all 
major cities and most minor cities now possess 
a sufficient number of competitive suppliers of 
transportation services. As a consequence, en-
try and rate regulation actually serves to 
diminish competition and thereby inflates 
prices, promotes inefficiency and retards inno-
vation. With improvements in technology 
leading to more and better forms of substitute 
methods of transport and with the overall 
growth of competing suppliers in general , there 
is little danger today of the recurrence of the 
monopolistic abuses which these old regula-
tions were originally enacted to prevent. 
Farmers, merchants, and shippers are no 
longer at the mercy of a single railroad for 
transporting their goods to market. In fact, 
because of technological advancements not 
available to the Grangers of 1887, most are not 
at the mercy of any railroad today. With the 
U.S. system of interstate highways and with ad-
vanced diesel engines, shipment by truck is us-
ually faster and more economical than ship-
ment by rail (Boyer, 1981, p. 59). Air transport, 
of course, offers another even faster alternative 
method of transport. By regulating price and 
entry, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) has effectively inhibited the competitive 
forces necessary to force the transportation sys-
tem to be as cheap and efficient as possible. 
The Doyle Report, a 1961 study of regulation 
initiated by President Kennedy, acknowledged 
these findings in charging that "regulatory poli-
cy has produced a general program of preserv-
ing the status quo which is in direct opposition 
to the over-all objective of a dynamic transpor-
tation system" (Boyer, 1981, p. 28). Again, al-
though these examples pertain strictly to the 
transportation industry, similar examples can 
be cited in communications, banking, and 
other industries still encumbered with much 
outdated regulation. Fundamental laws of eco-
nomics support claims that much of today's 
regulation is counterproductive in terms of the 
economic goals of competition, growth and effi-
ciency. 
III. Theoretical Justification for 
Deregulation 
If price and entry competition are con-
trolled, the incentive on the part of existing 
firms to operate most efficiently is inhibited. 
This allows companies to operate at less than 
optimum efficiency and to maintain excess 
profit margins without fear of competition. It 
also causes overall economic inefficiency 
because prices, distorted by controls and sub-
ject instead to the judgment of a regulatory 
commission, are no longer true indicators of 
the opportunity costs associated with the con-
sumer's choices among products and services. 
Finally, by guaranteeing markets and profits, 
the regulation of entry and price diminishes the 
incentive for firms to take risks associated with 
offering more innovative and varied products 
(Kahn, 1970, p. 67). I will elaborate upon each 
of these points in greater detail in the 
paragraphs below. 
In order to understand the problems asso-
ciated with regulatory price setting, one must 
first have a general understanding of how it is 
done. Rates are usually set by the commission 
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in charge of the industry. The commission at-
tempts to hold the company's rates to the sum 
of recent period operating costs, depreciation, 
and taxes, plus the commission's estimate of a 
reasonable profit (MacAvoy, 1979, p. 27). By 
simply allowing prices to rise with higher costs, 
a commission creates little incentive for a firm 
to hold down costs. By allowing unnecessary in-
creases in the costs of production or by misal-
locating overhead, a company can increase 
costs in ways which a commission may overlook 
when making price decisions. Yet, even if the 
commission had the power to prevent gross in-
efficiencies from arising, it could never provide 
the same incentive for a firm to increase effi-
ciency that free entry and competitively set 
prices could. A firm threatened by competition 
will constantly look for ways to cut costs; such 
action leads to efficiencies of production which 
would be unlikely to occur in a "safer" noncom-
petitive environment (Kahn, 1970, p. 27). 
Instead of being set by a commission's 
judgment on the proper allocation of profits 
and costs, prices should ideally be based on the 
long run marginal cost (LRMC) of production 
(Kahn, 1970, p. 159). 1 Since there exists little 
competition in most regulated environments, 
firms are not compelled to set prices at their 
long run marginal cost levels. In fact, the 
greater the control of entry and the lower the 
degree of competition, the greater will usually 
be the wedge between price and long run mar-
ginal cost no matter how strict a commission 
may try to be (Boyer, 1979, p. 13). Further-
more, the LRMC of a regulated firm will usually 
be higher than that of a firm faced with the 
competitive pressure to keep costs down or go 
out of business. 2 
1 Long run marginal cost is the increase in long run 
total cost resulting from the production of one more unit of 
output. The long run is defined to be the period in which 
capital (such as plant capacity) is a variable factor of pro-
duction . 
2This does not apply to true natural monopolies: that 
is , industries whose capital requirements are such that it is 
more efficient to have one supplier experiencing great 
economies of scale rather than many smaller suppliers with 
necessarily greater long run marginal costs. For example. in 
the telecommunications industry. AT&T was forced to give 
up its monopoly on long distance calls. Local calls. 
however. are still provided hy local natural monopolies 
because of economies of scale. 
Another fundamental consideration used 
by firms when determining prices is the price 
elasticity of demand for their products or serv-
ices. The price elasticity of demand for the 
product or service of any firm is determined 
largely by the number of competitors as well as 
by the number of substitute products (Kahn, 
1970, p. 159). By restricting the entry of new 
firms into industries, regulation creates a 
relatively more inelastic demand for the prod-
ucts of established firms thereby allowing them 
to price their products above cost. Deregula-
tion would allow entry of new firms to eliminate 
excess profits. Firms faced with more elastic de-
mand curves would be forced to lower prices in 
order to maintain sales. Furthermore, firms 
would be forced not only to eliminate waste, 
but also to search for new and more efficient 
ways to produce products or services, thereby 
lowering costs and prices even further. 
By artificially affecting prices and ·entry, 
regulation promotes inefficiency in a macro-
economic, as well as in a microeconomic, 
sense. Regulation distorts prices and therefore 
interferes with the price system's ability to en-
sure the efficient allocation of resources. By 
allowing companies to set prices at levels 
higher than LRMC or by forcing them to 
charge prices less than LRMC in some markets 
and greater in others, regulation results in con-
sumers overestimating or underestimating the 
opportunity cost associated with each product. 
If price is too low, consumers will buy more of a 
product than they normally would. For exam-
ple, if regulation artificially holds transporta-
tion prices low in order to favor a small com-
munity, then society is incurring more real 
resource costs in purchasing that service than 
are reflected in the price. Regulators compen-
sate carriers for this by allowing prices to be 
higher than LRMC in larger markets, where 
consumers wind up buying less of a product or 
service than they normally would. Overall 
everyone's wealth in terms of production of 
goods and services is negatively affected by this 
misallocation of resources (Kahn, 1970, p. 67). 
Finally, a less explicit cost of regulation of 
industry is a slowdown in the rate of advance-
ment and utilization of technology. Technology 
and innovation are particularly important be-
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cause they are the chief means by which an 
economy may sustain growth even though the 
amount of available resources stays constant. 
Given scarce resources, technological advance-
ments are imperative if continued economic 
growth is to be achieved. In this area the im-
petus of competition is again the key. If a firm 
is given a protected market with fixed rates and 
is not allowed to expand into other markets, 
there is little incentive to spend money on re-
search and development in order to reduce 
costs or to improve the quality and variety of 
the product or service. Furthermore, the un-
predictable nature of a market controlled by 
the whims of a regulatory commission make 
many research and development projects too 
risky to undertake. Because prices may change 
quickly due to public pressure on commissions, 
a firm may never be sure of the rate of return it 
will be able to earn on a project. Because of 
changing regulations, a firm may also never be 
sure that a new product or process will be 
allowed to yield a competitive advantage. Com-
bined with assured profits in its present pro-
tected market, these risks discourage invest-
ments in technology that might otherwise be 
undertaken. 
Not only does regulation result in an aver-
sion to technological development, but it also 
often retards the rate of diffusion of new tech-
nology among firms and between industries. 
This, too, is caused by stagnant protected mar-
kets that do not justify the cost of adapting to 
new technology. But it can also result because 
regulation often prevents firms from competing 
in two different sectors of the same basic indus-
try, thus blocking the adoption of new technol-
ogy. For instance, · in the railroad industry, 
"piggyback" operations (the transportation of 
truck trailers on railroad cars) were stymied for 
years because trucking companies were not al-
lowed to participate in railroad operations, and 
vice-versa (Boyer, 1979, p. 16). Similarly, in the 
finance industry banks were not allowed to pay 
even meager returns on checking until the De-
pository Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 made 
NOW accounts legal (Standard and Poor 's, 
1982, p. B15). 
In theory, then , the deregulation of an in-
dustry will lead to products with lower prices 
and higher quality by allowing competition to 
force out companies which do not eliminate in-
efficiencies. At the same time, overall economic 
efficiency will be improved by allowing prices to 
reflect the relative economic cost (in terms of 
resources used) of the various products and 
services. Finally, competition for new markets 
and better products will encourage innovation 
in product manufacture and design which will 
decrease costs while increasing the quality and 
variety of products offered. 
IV. The Effect of Regulatory Reform-
Trucking 
It is an old adage that many theories that 
seem to work in the classroom are totally un-
workable in reality. Therefore, the theoretical 
advantages of deregulation which were outlined 
earlier should be compared with the actual ex-
perience with deregulation. The analysis to fol-
low is based on the recent U.S. experience with 
deregulation in the trucking industry. 
Regulatory reform in the trucking industry 
began in the mid-1970s when a series of ICC 
decisions allowed for freer entry into the truck-
ing industry. Entry was made freer both by 
allowing new firms into the industry and by 
allowing old firms to seek out new territory. 
The ICC also changed pricing procedures to 
make it possible for more companies to adjust 
their rates individually. Former policy had been 
to allow only industry-wide price adjustments 
subject to ICC approval. Later, the Motor Car-
rier Act of 1980 (MCA) both broadened these 
reforms and initiated new ones as well. Specif-
ically, the Act removed the requirement that a 
carrier seeking to enter a new market must 
prove that its services would benefit a com-
munity. The Act further increased independent 
rate flexibility by establishing a "zone of rate-
making freedom" within which companies 
could adjust their rates without commission ap-
proval. Finally, the Act eliminated most regula-
tions which protected some carriers by forcing 
others to travel circuitous routes around estab-
lished territory. These reforms did not result in 
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the complete deregulation of trucking. How-
ever, they were applauded by most economists, 
who predicted that increased competition 
would lower rates by squeezing out excess prof-
its and lowering costs through increased effi-
ciency, while at the same time maintaining 
greater levels of service and quality (Mabley, 
1982, p. e36). As I will argue below, to a large 
degree the facts seem to have borne out these 
predictions. 
A. Competition 
One of the first measures of the success of 
deregulation is the increased level of competi-
tion. Competition becomes responsible for the 
checks on rates, service and quality that were 
once handled by a commission. On the heels of 
the ICC's unrestricted policy regarding entry 
after the passage of MCA came unprecedented 
numbers of permanent authority applications. 3 
In 1976 there were only 468 applications from 
potential firms, while in 1981 (after deregula-
tion) there were 3, 702 such requests. In all, 
97.9% of such requests in 1981 were approved, 
as opposed to only 83.9% in 1976. In addition, 
while requests for new markets by established 
firms numbered only 4, 710 in 1976, there were 
27,475 such requests in 1981. Approval rates 
also rose, from 69.8% in 1976 to 96.7% in 
1981. High as these numbers are, they actually 
understate . the increase in the rate of entry, 
since the ICC is now approving much broader 
definitions of markets and goods than it was in 
the years prior to the MCA (Mabley, 1982, p. 
42). For example, the commission now routine-
ly approves requests to haul "machinery be-
tween states," whereas before the carrier would 
have had to request authority to haul "mining 
equipment, one way, between cities" (Office of 
Policy and Analysis, p. 57). Along these same 
lines, the ICC under MCA Section 6 has been 
rapidly removing restrictions from existing cer-
tificates of operating authority, thereby allowing 
carriers to haul a greater variety of goods to a 
larger number of places. Together these re-
:!Application for the authority to operate a specific 
trucking route for an unlimited period of time. 
forms have enhanced competition by providing 
for a greater number of firms and by expanding 
the service offerings of existing carriers. 
Also contributing to greater competition in 
the trucking industry is the ICC's more liberal 
policy on granting temporary authority (T A) 
and emergency temporary authority (ETA) to 
service routes. 4 Until the MCA was passed, ap-
plying for this type of authority was a lengthy 
process and the chances of approval were slim. 
Since 1980. processing time for TAs has been 
shortened considerably with nearly 100% ap-
proval (Office of Policy and Analysis, p. 53). 
This change, of course. allows greater competi-
tion in the short-run as companies can react 
quickly to changes in demand. 
Another recent decision (1978) by the ICC 
which further increased competition for com-
modity traffic was one which allowed private 
carriers to take on goods for hire. Specifically, 
the commission ruled that a company not in 
the business of transporting others' goods, but 
rather hauling its own goods, could now obtain 
permission to haul someone else's goods on 
any return trip. Previous regulation had pro-
hibited private carriers from hauling goods for 
other companies. The MCA further liberalized 
this policy in its Section 9 ("compensated inter-
corporate hauling") by allowing a subsidiary of 
a conglomerate to haul goods for another sub-
sidiary. By June 2, 1981, 648 parent corpora-
tions, involving a total of 6, 755 subsidiaries, 
had filed for trucking rights under Section 9. 
As the Office of Policy and Analysis of the ICC 
stated in its preliminary report on the effects of 
the MCA, "These numbers represent a signifi-
cant interest in being ready to provide inter-
corporate hauling, and they are concrete 
evidence that a competition-inhibiting barrier 
has been eliminated" (Office of Policy and 
Analysis, p. 70). 
Competition from outside the trucking in-
dustry has been enhanced by the increased use 
of intermodal transportation, facilitated by the 
repeal of restrictive regulation. For example, by 
relaxing the laws prohibiting railroads from op-
erating trucks (and vice versa), the various com-
missions have allowed tractor trailers to be 
hauled on railroad cars. This efficient "pig-
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gyback" method of transport provides a flexible 
link between trains and trucking (Standard and 
Poor's, 1984, p. 101). 
B. Rates and Prices 
With greater competition and the relaxa-
tion of rate controls, one would expect prices in 
a regulated industry to decline. Again, the em-
pirical data for the trucking industry fully sup-
port this conclusion. By allowing firms to apply 
individually for rate decreases and even (within 
limits) to adjust rates without permission, firms 
have discounted rates in unprecedented num-
bers. Because the rate structure is so complex, 
however, there is no exact measure of the de-
cline in the overall rate level. But a series of 
monitoring reports from the ICC's Office of 
Policy and Analysis leaves no doubt that there 
is a definite trend toward either lower rates or 
less rapid rate increases than before. The year 
of passage of the MCA (1980) saw the highest 
number of independent rate actions ever for 
every major section of the country. The annual 
number of independent requests for rate 
changes averaged 20,685 for the years 1975-
1979, but rose to a level of 115,085 in 1981. 
Significantly, nearly all these proposals were for 
rate reductions (Mabley, 1982, p. 38). Competi-
tion has also rendered collective rate decision 
making nearly obsolete. Still, some large carri-
ers did try for a while to hold the line on the 
monopoly prices which they enjoyed under reg-
ulation. But in early 1982, one of the last hold-
outs and the nation's largest general freight 
carrier (Roadway Express) succumbed to com-
petitive pressure by offering its "All Savers" 
program, which provided discounts from 12-
20%. This signaled the effective end of collec-
tive rate making in the trucking industry. 
These rate reductions were made possible 
both by squeezing profit margins and by reduc-
ing costs through increases in efficiency. The 
drop in value of carrier operating rights pro-
vides a rough measure of the level of excess 
profits enjoyed by carriers before deregulation. 
Carrier operating rights give a carrier the right 
~Application for the authority to operate a specific 
trucking route for a limited period of time. usually 60 (ETA) 
or 90 (TA) days . 
to service a certain market. The value of these 
rights. which may be bought and sold, repre-
sents the present value of future profits that 
could be made in the industry above and be-
yond a "normal" profit margin. The American 
Trucking Association has estimated that in the 
years shortly before deregulation the real value 
of operating rights was between $5.1 and $6.8 
billion for carriers whose annual revenues ex-
ceeded $1 million each. Since deregulation. 
these excess profits have been reduced, and 
consequently the value of operating rights has 
fallen tremendously. For example, before de-
regulation the Wilson Freight Company paid 
$2.4 million for the Cincinnati-to-Atlanta rights 
which they recently sold for only $6.000. In 
fact. the depreciation has been so severe that 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board has 
ruled that because of the MCA the value of all 
interstate rights on a carrier's books should be 
reduced to zero (Mablcy. 1982. p. 39). 
Besides seeing their excess profits decline, 
many carriers have been forced to lower rates 
and become more efficient or face the alterna-
tive of going out of business altogether. In fact, 
the number of motor carriers going out of busi-
ness rose by 100% from the end of 1979 to the 
end of 1980, while the comparable percentage 
increase for all firms in the economy was 55% 
(Office of Policy and Analysis, p. 60). No doubt, 
some of these motor carrier failures were due 
to a weak economy, but to a large degree they 
also reflected the inability of inefficient firms to 
survive once the protective veil of regulation 
had been lifted. 5 
Not surprisingly, even the mighty Team-
sters Union has begun to feel the effects of 
competition. For years, the Teamsters were 
able to secure raises far in excess of increases 
in the cost of living with little resistance from 
management, because the higher labor costs 
could easily be passed on via rate increases ob-
tained through the rate bureaus. With the ad-
vent of competition, management has been 
forced to negotiate more firmly, and the power 
of the Teamsters has been weakened consider-
ably since it must now choose between lower 
wage increases and the threat of unemploy-
ment (Standard and Poor's, 1984, p. Tll3). 
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C. Quality and Variety 
Although it is certainly the case that de-
regulation has increased competition and there-
by lowered costs and prices, the issue of the 
quality and availability of service still remains 
to be discussed. Many of the reforms mentioned 
above have clearly led to more service options 
for the shipper. For example, as the number of 
new firms and the issuance of temporary au-
thority licenses has increased, so also has the 
number of carriers from which shippers can 
choose. Likewise , with the demise of exclusive 
operating rights and the proliferation of private 
carriers and intercorporate hauling, shippers 
have more choices than ever before. The spread 
of new technology, such as piggyback opera-
tions, has added even greater flexibility. 
The overall quality of service has also 
shown signs of improvement. By allowing piggy-
back operations, the MCA effectively encour-
aged investment in track repair, shipment trac-
ing methods and longer single-line movements, 
all of which have made railroad transport of 
truck trailers faster and more reliable (Stan-
dard and Poor's, 1984, p. T109). By allowing 
the entry of contract carriers, deregulation has 
also created the opportunity for shippers to 
take advantage of service tailored to their 
planned production schedules. Contract carrier 
service is used by auto manufacturers, food 
processors, major retail chains and other large 
companies to reduce inventory costs and in-
crease efficiency. Ironically, given the myriad of 
transportation choices available since deregula-
tion. shippers have found it increasingly 
difficult to compute and ke'ep track of the dif-
ferent available rates for transporting different 
products. Some carriers have simplified former-
ly complicated billing procedures in an effort to 
improve business. For example. carriers used 
to calculate rates according to fifteen "goods 
characteristics" such as weight, stowability. 
sunfortunately. many times bankruptcy and unemploy-
ment result not only from poor managem.ent but also 
because of the fact that a firm has been conditioned to max-
imize profits under conditions of regulation only to find that 
the government has changed the. "regulato::v rules of ,the 
game. " In the future. before enactmg legislati:>n>~he )4ove~~~ 
ment should consider the consequences of repeal. In these 
cases the problem is not deregulation. hut rather the fact 
that the re)4ulation wa~ imposed in the first place. 
ease of handling, etc. Some carriers now have 
eliminated all but the weight, density and 
mileage characteristics. As a result shippers 
can more easily compute rates for comparison 
among competing carriers (Standard and 
Poor's, 1984, p. T119). 
There is one last issue concerning the 
growth of services which should be addressed. 
That is the question of service to small com-
munities, a supposed justification for regulation 
in the first place. Opponents of deregulation 
have feared that transportation service to small 
communities would suffer as unregulated car-
riers moved to serve more profitable large com-
munities. Current data indicate that this fear 
was an unfounded one, however. A 1982 ICC 
survey of 1,200 shippers in small communities 
across the nation showed that most users 
believe that the variety and quality of service 
have increased rather than declined since de-
regulation. Specifically, the 1982 survey re-
vealed that 10.0% of those polled believed 
service availability had improved, while only 
3.3% said that it had deteriorated; the majority 
(86.7%) reported no change. Similarly, 10% of 
the small community shippers said that quality 
improved, while only 3% said it had declined. 
Again, 87% reported no change in service 
growth. Improvement is also reflected in the 
number of small community service complaints. 
The number of such complaints was lower in 
October of 1980 after the passage of the MCA 
than it was in October of 1979, while the per-
centage of small community complaints to total 
service complaints remained constant (Mabley, 
1982, p. 39). 
V. Conclusion 
When most regulation of industry was 
enacted during the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
the intent was to protect the public from the 
abuse of the monopoly power vested in new in-
dustries such as railroads. This power existed 
by virtue of the fact that there were very few 
transportation alternatives. Today, the state of 
affairs is very different than it was at the turn of 
the century. New technology has provided ship-
pers with a variety of choices for transporting 
their goods-planes, railroads, trucks, ships, 
and combinations of all four transportation 
modes. Furthermore, these industries have ma-
tured to the point that competition can be re-
lied upon to regulate the prices and variety of 
service, so that the price charged to the shipper 
can more fairly represent the economic cost of 
the service provided rather than the monopoly 
profits of a single supplier. Since the 1960s, 
regulation has tended more to protect the in-
dustry rather than the consumer. It has thereby 
encouraged the same abuses and inefficiencies 
which it sought to prevent some 60 years ear-
lier. In recognition of these facts, recent ad-
ministrations have begun to abolish archaic 
regulations and to dismantle the regulatory 
bureaucracy in some industries. The trucking 
industry is just one example of the success of 
these efforts. The success which deregulation 
has enjoyed in this instance provides strong 
evidence that future domestic economic policy 
should continue to stress the deregulation of 
industry so that the economy may enjoy the 
benefits of utilizing its resources more effi-
ciently.. 
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